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Abstract: The Obama administration repeated that its promise to withdraw from Iraq on time 
was one of its most important achievements in the first presidential term. In fact, this 
withdrawal was within a broader and broader context that began to emerge in Obama's second 
term: withdrawal from the Middle East, In the so-called Asia "Rebalance", but the growing 
international chaos and the explosion of many crises in the face of the US administration such as 
the Syrian crisis and Iraq, especially after the so-called Arab Spring revolutions, cast a shadow 
over the region, and turning Iraq from the success story of the Obama administration and a 
benchmark for its achievements in foreign policy, a story Failure and a standard of confusion in 
foreign policy, and critics of the Obama administration, the American withdrawal "arbitrary" 
created a vacuum in Iraq filled by the opponents of the United States and lose control, or at least 
affect the course of the arena, both at the level of local players or regional.  
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The importance of the subject 
 President Barak Obama’s winning a 
second presidential term in the United States 
of America represents an opportunity to raise 
a question on the limits of continuity and 
change in his strategy towards Iraq. There is 
no doubt that president Obama’s first 
presidential term witnesses important 
changes in his strategy in the United States 
towards Iraq. The most import of such 
changes is the American withdrawal from Iraq 
according to a timetable laid down by 
president Obama within certain phases. This 
withdrawal leads to many repercussions 
which resulted in the fact that Obama 
revisited his strategy in Iraq during his second 
presidential term [1, 2]. 
Therefore, the main question of the study is 
raised: what are the limits of change in the 
American strategy towards Iraq and its 
different issues in Obama’s second 
presidential term? What are the aspects of 
continuity in that strategy?  
This main question has many sub- 
questions:  
1-Is the American withdrawal from Iraq a part 
of a more comprehensive withdrawal of the 
United States from the Middle East or is it 
related to the very Iraqi status?  
2-Is Obama’s Administration serious to apply 
democracy in Iraq during Obama’s second 
presidential term or the retreating of this 
option before other options more realistic in 
DISCUSSION 
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relation to the issues of terrorism and 
security?  
3-What is the attitude of Obama’s 
Administration towards Iran and the 
reflection of such attitude to Iraq?  
Therefore, we will try to show the most 
important changes and to what extent they 
are continued and changed in Obama’s second 
presidency through three titles: U. S 
disengagement from Middle East, its topic is 
democracy and to what extent the U. S. 
Administration is committed to apply it in Iraq 
and, finally, the stance of the U. S. 
Administration in Iran and its reflections on 
Iraq. 
 
First: Disengagement from Iraq as 
part of the disengagement in the 
Middle East: 
By the time Barack Obama came to 
office in January 2009, the Middle East had a 
priority in his foreign policy and announced 
his intention to adopt an active policy on 
Middle East issues. In the first weeks of his 
term as President, he set a timetable for the 
withdrawal of US troops from Iraq and 
appointed a negotiator In order to seek a 
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
to open a new page with the Muslim world. He 
then sought to adopt policies that support the 
aspirations of the peoples of the region and 
raise the US commitment to send troops to 
Afghanistan. , Obama extends his hand to Iran 
in a presidential message on the occasion of 
Christmas Day including explicit mentioning 
Islamic Republic of Iran [3]. 
In fact, these policies were not the 
beginning of the gradual withdrawal from the 
Middle East, for several reasons: 
1. This region in the world is no longer 
attractive for U. S. decision makers as they 
used to. The region is no longer having the 
relative importance which it had in the past in 
relation to U. S policy as a result of the 
tremendous discoveries of rock oil in the 
United States. It leads to the fact that the 
United States will reach self- sufficiency of 
energy in the close future. Consequently, there 
is no need for oil imports from abroad 
especially from the Middle [1] East Therefore, 
the decrease of the need of the United States 
for the oil of the region becomes having an 
effect on the level of attention and relation to 
the region.  
2. The withdrawal of the United States from 
the Middle East under Obama was also a 
reflection of the attitudes of American public 
opinion is no longer enthusiastic about US 
intervention in the region, or excessive 
activity, as a result of the economic and 
human price paid by the United States in the 
invasion and occupation of Iraq. In addition, 
Obama and many US policymakers are 
convinced that the ability of the United States 
to influence the Middle East has become 
limited and unwelcome by the majority of the 
political forces in this region, especially in the 
post-Arab spring period. Of skepticism and 
lack of credibility. That is, there is a US 
recognition of the limited role it can play in 
the region, and not welcome, and therefore 
some American government circles reached 
realistic convictions, that there is no need to 
play such a role [4]. 
3. Finally, it cannot separate between Obama’s 
Administration orientation to limit its 
association to the Middle East and its seeking, 
in consideration, to increase attention to the 
Asian Continent, which many analysts 
consider behind decreasing the interest of the 
U.S.A in the Middle East and its eastern 
orientation to Asia as a result of the increasing 
importance of the South and South East of 
Asia in the global economy [5]. 
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In January 2012, an important strategic 
document issued from the White House on the 
change of the priorities of the United States of 
America from the Middle East and Europe to 
the area of the Pacific Basin and Asia. 
Consequently, the American attention of the 
Middle East witnesses a retreat especially in 
the second term of president Obama 
Administration. In contrary, the American 
interest in the Asian Continent increases 
whether for participation in the fruits of 
growth in such economically promising 
continent or for confronting the rise of the 
Chinese strategic influence in Asia. The 
Chinese influence threatens the American 
existence in the Asian continent and becomes 
the main source of threat for the United States 
of America. Therefore, we become before what 
is known as the strategy of “rebalance to Asia 
and Pacific Area [6]. 
On the other hand, the United States 
redefined its role and engagement in the 
Middle East in the form of a new strategy in 
fear of the economic and military 
consequences of direct engagement in the 
region and the rejection of American public 
opinion of this engagement [7]. 
The administration of President Barack 
Obama implements a plan for the restructure 
of the American role in the Middle East in the 
context of the transformation from the Middle 
East to the Pacific Basin and Asia in two 
phases. The first phase is within the first term 
from 2008 till 2012. The second phase is 
during the second presidential term from 
2012 – 2016 of which the nuclear agreement 
with Iran is [8].  
The analysis of the American treatment 
with the Middle East during the two phases 
reveals general features and directions of such 
change. They can be shown in the following 
aspects [9]. 
1. The First Stage: President Obama starts his 
first term by trials to bridge the gap between 
the United States and Islamic world especially 
the Middle East. This orientation, if 
highlighted, in Obama’s historic address at 
Cairo University in 2009 and the campaign of 
general relations made by the American 
Administration to communicate with the 
peoples of the Middle East in addition to steps 
taken on the course of ending the American 
involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan through 
gradual withdrawal and the plans of Obama to 
close Guantanamo detention camp which is 
not completed up till now. In addition to this, 
it is adopted the techniques and tools of the 
direct military non-engagement in 
confrontation of terrorism in the region, 
basically depending on Unmanned Aerial War 
and intensification of intelligence and security 
dealing with the countries of the region [10].  
2. Second Stage: this stage is related to 
Obama’s Administration seeking to make 
structural adapting to the change of strategic 
environment in the Middle East as a result of 
Arab revolutions which many Arab countries 
witnessed. These protests lead to the collapse 
of the national state in a number of states in 
the region and the rise of transnational terror 
movements. 
Therefore, Obama’s administration re-
phrased its dealing with the crises and issues 
of the Middle East in the framework of a 
comprehensive vision associated to avoiding 
engagement in new wars, trying to push the 
region’s states to deal with their crises 
directly, decreasing depending on the 
American role in addition to adopting a 
different dealing strategy with [11].  
With regard to Iraq, the Obama 
administration in its second term has shown 
little interest in the Iraqi situation and as part 
of the decline in US public interest in the 
region, 
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Throughout the years of the rule of 
Nuri al-Maliki, the Obama administration has 
been silent about its sectarian practices and 
the corruption that has shaped its rule. 
President Obama has been limited to 
withdrawing from Iraq and getting rid of the 
heavy legacy of the Bush administration. In 
this context, the Obama administration has 
supported the survival of al-Maliki for a 
second term (2010-2014), although the 
results have yielded little progress to the Iraqi 
List led by the Prime Minister Former Iyad 
Allawi on a coalition of state law headed by al-
Maliki, on the pretext that he could not be able 
to form a majority government [12]. 
The administration decided to continue 
its non-interference approach to Iraq's 
internal political affairs, but failed to find an 
alternative to the US military presence there 
with a solid set of civil, economic and other 
partnerships to maintain US influence in the 
face of the influence of regional powers that 
have begun to expand within Iraq. Obama 
even authorized his deputy, John Biden, to run 
the Iraqi file on his behalf, which in turn did 
little to restrain Maliki, but began to derail 
initial political deals between Sunnis, Shiites 
and Kurds within the federal Iraq. Obama's 
mistake was not only a military withdrawal 
from Iraq, but also a decline in diplomatic 
momentum and influence, which, if properly 
used to make the collapse of Iraq's political 
experience less likely [13]. 
Not only have that, but the Obama 
administration sought to employ the success 
of the withdrawal scenario from Iraq to justify 
its decision to withdraw its combat troops 
from Afghanistan. The administration 
responded to the criticisms it accuses of 
rushing to withdraw from Iraq and 
Afghanistan, leading to a vacuum that Iran, the 
Taliban and al-Qaeda and its affiliated 
organizations would complete. The 
withdrawal is not a change in the rules of 
engagement. Instead of direct military 
involvement. , The "Obama Doctrine” [2]. in 
foreign policy is based on special operations, 
drone attacks, as well as advising, training and 
arming the army and local security forces in 
the countries concerned [13]. 
The United States has maintained a 
certain amount of interest in Iraq for two 
reasons: First, oil. Despite the decline in the US 
need to import oil, it will remain keen on the 
continued flow of Iraqi oil to its allies at 
moderate prices because any tremors affect 
production or the export of Iraqi oil will lead 
to a rise in the price of oil in world markets. 
The other reason is the moral responsibility of 
the United States of America resulting from its 
occupation of Iraq in 2003, and its 
responsibility to maintain the political system 
it created [14]. 
The development of the situation in 
Iraq has led to the rise of extremist 
organizations and its president to organize a 
"preacher" as the Sunnis to detail, put the 
"principle of Obama" in front of a serious test, 
the US training does not benefit the Iraqi 
army, 
However, Obama’s Administration 
conclusively announced that it was not drawn 
in new military engagement in Iraq especially 
under an opposed American public opinion, 
but Obama’s Administration found itself in 
critical situation which does not allow to 
condone strengthening the grip of ISIS on a 
wide area of Iraqi lands which represented 
threatening to its interests in the region in 
addition to the threat which was represented 
to the interests and security of its allies 
especially Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Kurds, and 
Turkey. America returned to Iraqi arena. The 
United States regained its influence and 
power, which it lost when withdrew in late 
2011. This regaining which is resulted from 
the fact that ISIS controls wide parts of 
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countries after 9 June, 2014 [15], made all 
political aspiring and in need to American 
support to confront ISIS. Iraqi government can 
support America to regain the initiative to 
confront ISIS and Kurdish leaders which is 
supported by America to stop ISIS extension 
to Kurdstan and Sunnis who are aspiring that 
the American pressure contributes to correct 
the path of the government in Baghdad. Iran 
aspires that the confrontation of the United 
States with ISIS contributes to save it from 
having to wage war of attrition on ISIS on a 
wide area extending from Iraqi – Iranian 
borders to Lebanese-Syrian borders, Arab 
countries and Turkey which aspires that the 
American support contributes to stop the 
extension of ISIS bomb to the whole region.  
Therefore, this collective need was the 
access that enabled the United States 
exceptionally to restore the source of its 
power which in its role enabled it even in 
imposing its perceptions on the formation of 
Iraqi government after 2014 elections on Iran 
on the one [16]. On the other hand, president 
Obama launched a comprehensive strategy 
including air attacks against the sites and 
fortresses of ISIS, supporting and enhancing 
Iraqi Special Forces, sending American 
military advisers to provide aid and 
consultations to Iraqi government and 
accelerating delivering weapons and 
equipment on which it was previously 
contracted between Baghdad and Washington. 
The U. S. strategy included also cooperation 
with international and regional allies to from 
an international alliance to take political and 
military actions against ISIS which Obama 
called “long-term campaign” to defeat this 
organization [17]. It was remarkable that 
Obama’s language changed from diplomatic 
language focusing on opening a new page in 
the relation with Islamic world which he 
started in his first presidential term as he said 
in his address in Cairo in June, 2009 to the 
language of war and threat with launching a 
war against ISIS which prompted the U. S. 
media and many political analysts to make 
comparisons showing the similarities of 
words of Obama’s speech and words of speech 
of his ancestor Bush. Obama and his 
supporters do not like these comparisons [18].  
Obama tried to convince the world that 
the war declared on ISIS was a necessary and 
not optional war as the war launched by his 
ancestor Bush the son on Iraq on 2003 and the 
sole goal of this war is to combat global 
terrorism. Because the war against ISIS may 
continue for long years, it is necessary to 
combine all international efforts to confront 
this terrorism. 
 
Second: the position of the Iraqi 
political process. 
In its first term, the Obama 
administration took a stand against the ideas 
of its predecessor, George W. Bush, on 
promoting democracy and regime change in 
the Middle East. Obama did not prioritize the 
issue or make it a condition for developing its 
relationship with the region [19]. 
We have explained how he overlooked 
the survival of al-Maliki in the post of prime 
minister after the 2010 elections, although the 
results resulted in a slight progress of the 
Iraqi List led by former Prime Minister Iyad 
Allawi, a coalition of state law headed by al-
Maliki, on the pretext that he could not form 
Allawi Majority government [12]. 
However the events of the so-called 
Arab Spring in 2011 led to a shift in the 
Obama administration's position on the issue 
of democracy in the Middle East. It supported 
the demonstrations calling for change in the 
Arab countries and demanded that its allies 
give up the government, as happened with the 
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two presidents: Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni 
Mubarak in Egypt [4]. 
Barack Obama is above all a pragmatist 
who does not accept the attempt to develop or 
implement a broad vision for a region like the 
Middle East, and for this, he adopted patterns 
of clear disparities and a changing approach to 
each case according to the situation. Tunisia 
and Egypt. At the same time, it is more 
inclined to maintain the current situation, 
especially in the case of conservative 
monarchies. From this point of view, Obama 
has taken his stand towards events in Iraq 
during that period. 
As from February, 2011, Iraq 
witnessed a number of protests in Tehran 
Area in the center of Baghdad to mend the 
political process after it had reached a blind 
alley. Some considered that they were from 
the most tremendous protests since America 
occupied Iraq in 2003, affected by revolutions 
broken out in a number of Arab countries 
which succeeded in toppling the ruling elites 
peacefully as it was in Tunisia and Egypt, or by 
a civil war and a foreign military action as is 
the case in Libya, or by the intervention of a 
third party as is the case in Yemen.  
At the end of 2012, these protests were 
renewed with the detention of Iraqi Minister 
of Finance then, Rafee Al- Eisawi, a leader in 
the Iraqi list, to the extent that they issue an 
arrest warrant accusing him of terrorism 
prompting such group of tribes and Iraqi 
Sunni powers to organize revolutions and 
protests in governorates of Sunni majority in 
the west, north, and middle beginning from 
Anbar governorate. The continuation of these 
revolutions is related to the effects of progress 
made by Sunni powers in Syria which clearly 
appeared that the balance of powers of them 
and Assad’s regime began to tend to them. In 
2013, these protests reached their climatic 
point when Iraqi government, leaded by Nouri 
Al- Maliki, exercised violence to end the 
clashes which resulted in Fallujah accident on 
25 January, 2013. It led to the killing of seven 
persons because the army shot the protesters 
during performing Friday prayer [20].  
On the other hand, Mr. Al- Maliki 
sought to distort revolutions when he warned 
in his declaration of the conspiracies of 
regional intelligence and remains of the 
previous regime and Qaeda Organization to 
drag the army to confront the protesters. On 
the third hand, Al- Maliki resorted to distance 
himself from responsibility of Iraqi Council of 
Representatives for meeting protesters’ 
demands. Also, he formed a ministerial 
committee comprised of seven ministers 
headed by Hussein Al- Shahristani, dupty 
prime minister, to discuss the demands of 
protesters [21].  
The Obama administration's position 
came from those protests and demonstrations, 
contrary to its support for the so-called Arab 
Spring revolutions. It continued to support 
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and ignored his 
exclusionary policies and his rejection of the 
protesters' demands. The Obama 
administration's refusal to support the 
"moderate rebels" in Syria against Bashar al-
Assad's regime allowed the organization to 
"expand" into Syria and then move to Iraq. 
The Obama administration therefore found it 
in its interest to support al-Maliki and the 
Iraqi army and security forces to counter any 
protests for fear of a resurgence in Iraq after 
its achievements on Syrian soil. Especially, 
after he began to be reluctant due to some 
members holding extreme slogans in these 
Iraqi protests. Therefore, Obama’s 
Administration hoped that Al- Maliki’s forces 
could defeat this organization. Therefore, it 
would be the best answer to the critics of 
Obama’s administration and evidence that 
“Obama’s Principle” in the foreign policy is 
still operative especially in its part that is 
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related to supporting, arming and consulting 
allies without need to intervene directly [22]. 
In return for supporting Maliki 
politically and militarily, the Obama 
administration has repeatedly asked him to 
open up to his Arab and Kurdish political 
opponents, even within his Shiite coalition, 
and make changes in favor of the political 
process, but Maliki continued to stubbornly 
and refused to provide any goodwill gestures 
towards the formation Consensus 
Government [23]. 
 
Shift in Obama's position 
Many factors played a role 
transforming the attitude of Obama’s 
Administration towards these events that Iraq 
witnessed. After turning the blind eye to Al- 
Maliki, his policy and ignoring popular 
protests, Obama’s Administration found itself 
in a dangerous trouble represented in a 
sudden progress of ISIS forces and Sunni clans 
allied with ISIS at the outset of June, 2014. ISIS 
forces defeated Iraqi forces and controlled 
Masul, cities and small towns in the north 
west of Iraq. ISIS forces unified themselves in 
Syrian and Iraqi regions on both sides of the 
border to be under their control. They 
approached Jordanian and Saudi borders and 
increased risks of their marching towards 
Baghdad which they controlled and declared it 
“Islamic Caliphate”. 
It was clear that years of 
marginalization, repression and targeting of 
Sunni Arabs had created a favorable 
environment in their ranks to accept a "push" 
at the expense of the sectarian system 
established by Maliki and the sectarian army 
he is sponsoring. Thus, Maliki, who closed the 
ways to keep any US force on Iraqi soil in late 
2011, found himself pleading this time to US 
military support to confront the march of 
"da'ash" and the Sunni clans. This was 
followed by granting US forces the judicial 
immunity he rejected years ago. However, 
Maliki’s move came too late. The issue seemed 
more than just providing US military or air 
support. It was related to his authoritarian 
and authoritarian rule [24]. 
It is the matter which made Obama’s 
Administration this time to make any military 
assignment to Al- Maliki as a first step to form 
a participatory consensus government that 
does not exclude anyone especially Sunni 
Arabs and Kurds. The matter reached to ask 
Al- Maliki to step down. The lateness of the 
American military intervention aimed at 
exercising pressure on Al- Maliki to accept 
such expanded format or to go out of the 
whole political scene and replace another 
character which is less attractive from inside 
the ruling Shiite coalition. In spite of the fact 
that Shiite National Alliance (which the block 
of state law led by Al- Maliki is considered its 
biggest constituents in Iraqi parliamentary 
elections in April, 2014) received a thin 
majority which did not enable him to form the 
government severally, Al- Maliki, was not able 
to form a government till the day of the 
declaration of his withdrawal as a candidate 
for prime minister. It is because Sunni and 
Kurds refused to work with him owing to his 
policies of exclusion against them and because 
many constitutes of Shiite alliance itself 
rejected the very Al- Maliki because he 
marginalized them in the past [23]. 
President Obama considered the 
political system based on democracy and 
broad participation In the presence of a 
comprehensive government that includes all 
sectors of the people is the main guarantee to 
solve the problems of countries such as Iraq, 
which suffered and suffers from infighting and 
internal conflicts. In addition that the 
exclusion of any major party or component 
from contributing to the political process 
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would threaten the security and future of 
those countries [25]. 
The US is convinced that Maliki's 
departure is a condition to address the root 
causes of the crisis in Iraq. The broader base 
of Sunni insurgents is not a "preacher." They 
are Sunni tribal fighters who have rebelled 
against sectarianism and secessionism and are 
no longer tolerated. Many of the Sunni tribal 
rebels were awakening fighters who helped 
the United States defeat Al-Qaeda in 2006-
2007, and Maliki refused to integrate them 
into the Iraqi army and security forces [26]. 
Thus, the US military intervention in 
favor of the Maliki government would appear 
to be standing with the Shiites and Iran 
against the Sunnis and America's allies in the 
region, especially Saudi Arabia resentful of 
Maliki and his Iranian patron. Obama said in 
an interview with The New York Times that he 
would not accept US fighter jets to become an 
air force for the Shiite government. He also 
stressed that Iran must understand that 
seeking absolute control over Iraq through its 
Shi'ite ally would have adverse consequences 
[27]. 
With the pressure on Maliki in 
particular, especially by the religious 
authority, and externally by Washington as 
well as Tehran, which lifted the cover by 
blessing Haidar Abadi to prime minister, was 
finally forced to announce the waiver of the 
installation of a third mandate. Thus, Maliki's 
paper has folded America in coordination with 
Iran, which some officials confirmed that the 
consensus on Abadi came after US-Iranian 
talks. 
 
Third: the position of Iran and its 
implications on Iraq: 
Obama at the beginning of his first 
presidency adopted the policy of openness to 
Iran, and defended the policy of engagement 
or diplomatic option with them, and explained 
that diplomacy with Iran could serve US 
interests better than sanctions, and that these 
sanctions succeeded in bringing Iran to the 
negotiating table, Iran's nuclear program has 
been reduced, but it has expanded under 
sanctions. The use of the military option in 
dealing with Iran will have devastating 
consequences in the Middle East region and 
therefore, the diplomatic option is best to deal 
with Iran [28]. 
In addition, began a series of political 
rapprochement with her in the message of 
congratulations on the "Nawruz" directed by 
Obama to the Iranian people and his 
leadership, and was in the background of his 
thinking to seek a tangible convergence with 
Iran. This was followed by personal messages 
exchanged between Obama and Supreme 
Leader Khamenei in 2009, and secret bilateral 
negotiations before Hassan Rohani's election 
in Iran in the spring of 2013 [29]. 
With Obama’s second presidential 
term, negotiations were changed gradually to 
bilateral negotiations between Washington 
and Tehran and culminated at the end by 
concluding a comprehensive agreement on 
Iranian Nuclear Program in October, 2015. 
President Obama personally explained his 
idea that the Nuclear Agreement is part of 
security arrangement in the region. He 
considered this agreement the “Arc Center” 
and main focus of his regional policy. It has 
become variable on which is difficult to jump 
in the regional U. S. approach for the balance 
of power in the region [30].  
 Obama’s second Administration is 
characterized by transforming from the stage 
of quiet diplomacy to the stage of cooperation 
declared with Tehran especially in relation to 
Iraqi and Syrian issues. U. S-- Iranian relations 
had a strong boost when Hassan Rohani was 
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presided over on third of August, 2013. He 
started his era with an initiative to 
rapprochement with Washington. The U. S. 
President, Barack Obama, responded to this 
initiative by sending a friendly message to his 
Iranian counterpart followed by another letter 
to Rohani asking him to make a written 
commitment in which he declared that his 
state was not desirous to produce nuclear 
weapons in preparation for direct 
negotiations and achieving a breakthrough in 
bilateral relations between the two countries. 
On 20 April, 2014, following such 
correspondence Washington Institute’s study 
said that there was a transformation in the U. 
S. attitudes towards the evaluation of the 
Iranian role in the region. The study noted 
that there were new orientations of the White 
House to formulating a comprehensive 
security strategy for the region in 
understanding with Iran [31].  
Lessons learned from the history of US 
policy in the Middle East indicate that behind 
every US coalition or agreement related to any 
of the region's files is a hidden agenda that is 
often directed against Arab interests. 
In this context, Obama ridiculed all his 
efforts and possibilities in Iraq to conclude a 
nuclear agreement with Iran. The head of the 
Iraqi opposition office in Washington during 
the occupation of Iraq, Intifad Qanbar, which 
was considered the right arm of Ahmed 
Chalabi, the godfather of the US occupation of 
Iraq, "When the agreement was signed With 
the Obama administration, there were two 
secret agreements Janabitan did not announce 
to the American people and the world on the 
coordination of US - Iranian inside Iraq, which 
means that the Obama administration has 
given Iraq to Iran on a plate of gold, "in order 
to achieve that agreement [32]. 
In fact, Iran does not trigger crises in 
the region, but exploits its crises in managing 
its foreign relations. It is "ingenious" in using 
"soft power" to manage regional conflicts. It 
may have benefited from the Israeli invasion 
of Lebanon in 1982, the US invasion of 
Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, 
respectively, and directed its results and 
results to serve their interests in the region. 
Iran does not seek nuclear weapons, if 
it seeks to possess them, for use in any 
possible military battle. This is not an end in 
itself, but an instrument to maximize its 
influence in the region and to entice the West 
to recognize the Iranian regime as a regional 
force in its geographical environment [33]. 
The political system in Iran has obtained 
western approval after the nuclear agreement, 
to shake it or remove it. The Obama 
administration has realized that the regional 
files, especially the Iraqi file, which is 
considered the "crown jewel" in the Iranian 
project and the Syrian file, which is the sole 
guarantor of this Dora, are more important to 
Iran than its nuclear program. The relations 
between Iran and the West will undoubtedly 
influence these two countries over the Iranian 
nuclear file in the future [34]. 
The rise of ISIS Organization and 
controlling wide areas in Iraq and Syria 
pointed to American– Iranian rapprochement 
to mutual and indirect intelligence and logistic 
coordination in Iraq in spite of the exclusion of 
Tehran starting from the international 
coalition against ISIS Organization under the 
need of its influence on the parties of the Iraqi 
political equation towards unifying its efforts 
against ISIS due to the failure of the U. S. Air 
Force alone to defeat ISIS and the refusal of 
sending ground military forces there in 
addition to Washington’s concerns about its 
military consultants in Iraq due to any 
potential tension with Iran that adversely 
affected them [35]. 
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American- Iranian cooperation has 
started to take political, security and military 
dimensions since 2014. Politically, removing 
Al- Maliki from the political process and 
forming a new Iraqi government expressing 
better about the closes of Iraqi people. It was 
necessary for the American side to 
communicate with the Iranian side which has 
clear effect on Iraqi political arena, that is, the 
American recognition of Iran as a main player 
in the issue and area’s affairs [36].  
Security and military, in March 2015, 
Frederick Hooof, who is, previously, in charge 
of the Syrian file in the U. S. Department of 
State, leaked details on a series of secret 
American- Iranian meetings held in the past 
months to discuss the Iranian role in 
confrontation of mutual security risks 
between Washington and Tehran. Hoof spoke 
about the importance of the fifth round in the 
past February. The two parties agreed to 
evaluate risks that the region might confront if 
the Syrian regime collapsed.  
Hoof’s leakages coincided with the 
emergence of Iraqi militias of Hezbollah 
associated to Iranian Quds Force in video clips 
supplied with American heavy weapons and 
equipment including M1 Abrams tanks, Mm3 
troop carriers, Hurnvees, and Mine- Resistant 
Ambush Protected Vehicles MRAP in light of 
news that Shiite militias obtained American 
weapons like Asaeib Al- Haq, Badr 
Organization and Promised Day Brigade which 
carries out hostilities in Iraq and Syria under 
the supervision of Major General, Qasaem 
Soliman, the commander of the Quds Force.  
The website of Bloomberg published 
dangerous information that weapons, which 
had been sent by the American Administration 
to Iraqi army, went to the hands of militias 
associated to Iran. According to a top official 
in the American Administration, the website 
said” the U. S. Administration realized that the 
recently formed bridges in Iraqi army were 
composed of militias working under the 
control of the Iranian Quds Force, but they 
turned a blind eye to that, Senator John 
McCain asserted that the U. S. army was aware 
that Iraqi leadership had delivered militias 
associated to Iran many equipment and 
weapons shipped by Washington to Iraqi 
army. It is because they believe that Iraqi will 
needs a long time and hard exercise to reach 
the level of combat readiness although the 
factor of time did not help to do that.  
It is evident that the U. S. attitude 
represented in Barack Obama’s 
Administration is no longer hide its 
appreciation to Iran’s firmness against wars 
and pressures which the West was behind 
them, building a state in spite of embargo 
imposed on it, its success in its adaptation to 
the result of Gulf war against it and its 
acceptance to work with the U. S.  
Administration in the fields in which the 
interests intercept (Afghanistan, Iraq, war on 
terrorism). Therefore, president Obama’s 
readiness to allow Iran to transform to be a 
very successful regional power if it reaches a 
long- term agreement on the nuclear file with 
the West [36].  
Obama expresses “we experienced 
everything with Tehran. We become having 
two choices: war or agreement. We choose 
agreement. It was reached to this agreement 
after more than three decades of difficult 
negotiations and trials to control Iranian 
regime and become before new variable and 
approach for the region according to Obama’s 
vision. It means that the U. S. A. allows Iran to 
stabilize its influence in Iraq and its 
surroundings, enable Iran to play a main role 
in the political settlement in Iraq and Syria, 
and enable Iran to divide the influence with 
Turkey as it is the other face of political Islam 
[30]. 
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Conclusion 
We conclude from the above that the 
limits of continuity and change in Obama’s 
strategy in his second presidential term show 
much continuity with some change from the 
first presidential term as a result of 
circumstances and developments during his 
second presidency. In relation to 
disengagement in Iraq, Obama showed a 
limited attention to Iraqi status which is part 
of the retreat of the general U. S. interest in the 
Middle East. Obama was interested in the 
withdrawal from Iraq and getting rid of the 
heavy legacy left by his ancestor Bush the son, 
but the developments of the situation in Iraq 
and the rise of extreme organizations and on 
top of them is ISIS Organization helped the U. 
S. A. to come back to Iraqi arena without direct 
intervention. In relation to the attitude 
towards the political process in Iraq, Obama’s 
Administration gave the topic of combating 
terrorism and issues of strategic and security 
the utmost importance at the expense of the 
political process and its requirements from 
the balances across consensual democracy 
which ruled Iraq since 2003. Therefore, this 
administration went back to adopt a realistic 
approach in dealing with Iraqi issues. Obama’s 
administration continued its policy of opening 
up to Iran which it started in the first 
presidential term and culminated it by the 
nuclear agreement which Obama considered 
the most important of his achievements in the 
second presidential term which was on the 
account of Iraq when Obama’s administration 
allowed to Iran to play more important roles 
in Iraq and the region. It helped to maximize 
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